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In two recent numbers of the Dickinson Law Review, Mr. J. P.
McKeehan pointed out some points of difference in various provi-
sions of the Uniform Sales Act, the Warehouse Receipts Act the
Uniform Bills of Lading Act, and the Uniform Stock Certificate
Act, and suggested that these Acts ought to be uniform with one
another, and the documents dealt with in them put “on exactly the
same basis.”  He adds: “It would greatly reduce the labor of stu-
dents and practitioners and the writer knows of no objection which
could be urged against such a course.”
Mr. McKeehan has rendered good service in comparing these
various statutes, and he might well have included in his comparison
the Negotiable Instruments Law.  To such a proposed addition he
would probably reply that a bill of exchange or promissory note is
not a document of title.  This is true, but neither is a stock certifi-
cate. Like a promissory note it is itself an obligation or the tangible
evidence of an intangible obligation, rather than the symbol of tan-
gible property; and if a stock certificate is to be compared with a
warehouse receipt, a promissory note which presents a nearer anal-
ogy, might well be.
This suggestion is made because it will indicate to the reader at
once that there may be some objection to putting the various docu-
ments on exactly the same basis.  The reader may perceive that per-
haps mercantile custom in regard to the use of the several
documents is not identical, and because of this difference the ques-
tions which in fact arise and press for decision are not identical.
It  would have been simpler and easier for  students to remem-
ber, if it  were  provided  that  the  endorsement  of  a bill of lading
or warehouse  receipt  had  the  same effect  as the  endorsement  of
a  promissory note.  There is perhaps no good reason in theory why
it should not have that effect, but law and custom are both other-
wise, and the Commissioners did not conceive it to be their duty to
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attempt for the sake of symmetry to reverse existing law and
custom.
It is no doubt true that if three at least of the commercial acts
of which Mr. McKeehan wrote (for the stock transfer act should be
excluded) had been simultaneously prepared, greater similarity of
wording in some instances, and of substantive law in one or two
matters, might have been achieved.  As each successive Act was
drawn, the temptation to attempt improvements existed, and to a
slight extent was yielded to.  The following examination will, how-
ever, show that most of the differences in the statutes are not acci-
dental but intentional, and exist for good reasons.
The Commissioners in drawing the statutes observed two prin-
ciples, which, on the whole, seem wise.
First, to follow existing law unless it conflicted with recognized
mercantile custom;
Second, to make special provision for cases which had in fact
caused litigation and diversity of judicial decision.
Matters which conceivably might arise, but in fact had not
arisen, were not much dealt with, except so far as the general princi-
ples laid down in the Act necessarily involved a decision of them.
This accounts for certain  of  the  instances where a  provision  is
made in  regard  to one kind of document but no corresponding
provision in regard to other documents, though the same situation
is theoretically possible.  Drafts  with  warehouse   receipts  at-
tached,  or  with stock certificates attached, may be sent like drafts
with bills of lading attached, but while the practice is so common
with bills of lading as to make it  desirable  to  state  fully  the rights
of the parties, the same fullness did not seem necessary  with  ware-
house  receipts  and  stock certificates.
With this introduction some comments may be made on a few
of the specific points of Mr. McKeehan’s articles
Permissible Provisions in Documents
“A warehouseman, as the critic says, may insert any other pro-
vision not ‘contrary to the provisions of the act.’  But a carrier may
not insert any provision ‘contrary to law or public policy.’”
There is a good reason for this distinction.  It was found possi-
ble to insert in the Warehouse Receipts Act, a sufficient code to
cover all that was forbidden.  It was not possible to do this in the
case of a bill of lading.  Interstate bills of lading are governed as to
their form by the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
It was of vital importance that the State statute should be and
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should continue in harmony with the rules laid down in Washing-
ton.  Moreover some of the provisions in bills of lading may be gov-
erned by the lex loci solutionis, and a statute in force in the place of
the contract cannot dictate what shall be permissible in another
state.
Marking Documents
Mr. McKeehan asks why should not failure to mark a docu-
ment “not negotiable” result in making the document negotiable;
or, why require the insertion of the words at all.  He points out that
it is folly to rely upon the presence or the absence of the words
under the present law, since creditors may levy on the goods. The
conclusion of the Commissioners on this matter, seems amply justi-
fied.  Nobody ought to rely on the presence or absence of the words
in question, but many foolish persons do.  When the public has be-
come as well educated in regard to the importance of the words
“order” or “bearer” in bills of lading as it is in regard to those
words in promissory notes, marking documents “not negotiable”
will probably be unnecessary.  At present it is desirable in order to
save foolish or ignorant persons from the consequences of their
mistakes.  The penalties in the Statutes are sufficient to induce
warehousemen and carriers to mark the documents as the law re-
quires, and if this result is achieved the object of the Commissioners
has been obtained.  On the other hand, it did not seem wise to dis-
regard the whole mercantile doctrine as to the presence or absence
of the words “order,” or “bearer,” determining negotiability, and to
substitute a marking or failure to mark “not negotiable” as an ex-
clusive test.  If a bailee issued a document to order, and marked it
“not negotiable,” it would then be non-negotiable.  This was an es-
pecially obnoxious habit by which some carriers sought to limit
their obligations on order bills.  The reason why criminal liability
instead of civil liability is provided for failure properly to mark bills
of lading is not due to accident.  A bill of lading issued in Penn-
sylvania where the Bills of Lading Act is in force, may be bought in
Mississippi where that Act is not in force.  Whether the Penn-
sylvania law could give the Mississippi buyer  by virtue of the
purchase of the document a right which the Common law did not
give, and make the right enforceable in Mississippi may perhaps be
questioned.  The desire of the Commissioners was to induce the
carrier to mark the document carefully.  The criminal penalty in the
case of the carrier seemed the only effective way.
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Assent to Terms
There has been much litigation upon the question whether the
acceptance of a bill of lading without objection indicates assent to
its terms.  The point therefore is covered in the Bills of Lading Act.
There has not been the same litigation, in regard to warehouse re-
ceipts, whether because receipts do not ordinarily contain the nu-
merous and frequently harsh provisions of bills of lading, it is
unnecessary to inquire.  The competition between warehouses in
the same city creates a situation where it is impossible for an indi-
vidual warehouseman to impose severe conditions.  As practical
conditions seemed to require no legislation concerning warehouse-
men on the point, it was left to the common law.  There is no reason
to doubt that acceptance of a warehouse receipt, like the accept-
ance of a written contract to buy and sell, indicates assent to its
terms.
Excuses for Non-Delivery of Goods
Again the critic seems to assume that there is no reason for the
Warehouse Receipts Act requiring the warehouse man to find his
excuse in the provisions of the Act, while carriers may offer “any
lawful excuse.”  If he will consider that the Pennsylvania Statute
cannot determine what excuse should be sufficient for discharging
the carrier from liability when he delivers the goods in Virginia, the
reason will be plain.  Obviously it will not do to hold the carrier
liable in Pennsylvania for something which the Virginia law com-
pels him to do.  Where goods are to be stored continuously in a
State which enacts the Uniform Statute, all excuses may be stated
and a more complete dealing with the situation is possible than
where they are to be transported to other States which may not
enact the Statute.
Delivery To Agent
What has been just said also applies to the justification given
the carrier when compelled by legal process.  The Pennsylvania
statute cannot prevent goods being taken from the carrier by legal
process in another State, but it can provide that they shall not be
taken from a “Pennsylvania warehouseman except as stated in the
statute itself.”  As to the requirement of written authority in the
Warehouse Receipts Act while oral authority suffices under the
Bills of Lading Act, it is to be said that these provisions were made
after careful consultation with the American Warehousemen’s As-
sociation on the one side, and representatives of leading railroads
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on the other.  The different ways in which business is transacted by
carriers and warehousemen is the cause of the difference. A ware-
houseman need do business only at one warehouse, or a few ware-
houses, all ordinarily in the same city, a carrier must do business at
hundreds of stations—many of them small, and in charge of clerks
who receive small compensation. Moreover, the carrier far more
frequently than the warehouseman is under pressure to make deliv-
ery promptly.
Lost Documents
The reason for requiring greater strictness in regard to lost
warehouse receipts than in regard to documents issued by carriers
and corporations is because many States impose little or no limita-
tion on the right of any person, whether financially responsible or
not, to go into the business of warehousing.  In consequence of this
also it seemed desirable to impose a criminal penalty for issuing a
receipt to replace one alleged to be lost, without proceedings estab-
lishing the fact of loss.
Use of Duplicates
Once more, the fact that warehouse receipts relate to goods in
storage, while bills of lading relate to goods being transported, is
the cause of a difference between the Statutes, namely that in re-
gard to implied warranties on the issue of duplicates.  If a ware-
house receipt is cancelled, it is cancelled where it is issued; but a bill
of lading issued in Philadelphia may be cancelled in San Francisco;
and the degree of knowledge of the situation which is possible in
the case of warehouse receipts to any warehouseman who is not
negligent, may not be possible in the case of bills of lading.  For this
reason too, knowledge on the part of the carrier is made a condition
of criminal liability.
Bailee Claiming Title
The Warehouse Receipts Act states that the warehouseman
can only set up a title in himself “derived directly or indirectly from
the depositor, etc.”  The critic says: “Surely a warehouseman may
acquire title from one named in the receipt by the depositor’s direc-
tion as the one to whom the goods are deliverable.  And surely he
may acquire title from one to whom a negotiable bill or receipt has
been negotiated, or from the transferee of a straight bill or receipt.”
Surely he may ordinarily, the act says so, for such a title is derived
either directly or indirectly from the depositor.  The only difference
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between the literal meaning of the provision in the Warehouse Re-
ceipts Act, and that in the Bill of Lading Act is that under the latter
Statute, a title acquired by the consignee from some other source
than a direct or indirect transfer from the consignor, will pass to the
purchaser.  This is not expressly stated in the Warehouse Receipts
Act, and the wording in the later Act was accordingly changed but
it seems probable that a court would reach this desirable result even
under the Warehouse Receipts Act.
What has already been said in regard to the difference of the
nature of the business of storing in one State and transporting to
other States, is the reason for the intentional difference of the acts
in regard to the particularity with which the amount of liens must
be stated.
Accommodation Bills and Receipts
How far Statutes, such as those in question, should codify the
law of agency is a practical rather than a theoretical question.  The
law is a seamless garment, and it is impossible to find a fixed bound-
ary for a given subject.  In general it was not deemed wise to codify
the law of agency as applied to all the situations where an agent
might act in connection with documents of title.  The issue of ficti-
tious or accommodation bills by railroad agents was, however, of
such common occurrence and had been the subject of so much liti-
gation that a provision in regard to it was inserted.
The critic comments on the risk of which the purchaser runs in
regard to the quality of the goods; he does not, however, suggest
that the rule of the Statutes is improper.  The provisions in question
were elaborately discussed by warehousemen, carriers and lawyers,
and the final result was not reached carelessly or without thorough
inquiry as to its practical applications.
Creditors’ Remedies
The same may be said in regard to the remedies provided by
the Acts for attachment and levy.  If these provisions do not go to
the full extent of the mercantile theory that the negotiable docu-
ment is the sole representative of the property, and while outstand-
ing precludes seizure of the goods as was suggested in the original
drafts of the earlier Acts, the advance upon the existing law is strik-
ing; and though it is theoretically possible that an injunction will be
violated and a transfer made in spite of it, this will not often
happen.
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The Form of Negotiable Documents
The Warehouse Receipts Act provides for negotiable receipts
either to order or to bearer. Under the Bills of Lading Act, the only
negotiable bills are order bills.  After conferences with Warehouse-
men’s Association, it appeared that warehouse receipts were some-
times issued to bearer.  Bills of Lading have not been issued in this
form generally, if they have been at all, in recent years.  The uni-
form forms of bills of lading framed by the Interstate Commerce
Commission do not provide for bills to bearer.  The Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws took these mercantile customs as they
found them, especially as they seemed unobjectionable.  Then, as
bills of lading are not allowed under the Uniform Act to be issued
to bearer, there was no occasion to provide that a holder of a bill, in
form negotiable by delivery, might restrict the negotiability by en-
dorsement to himself or to a specified person.  The bill of lading
will not be negotiable by delivery except when endorsed in blank.
By filling in his own name or that of another over the blank en-
dorsement, the negotiability of the bill, without the necessity of a
new restrictive endorsement.
The Bills of Lading Act requires that the words “to the order
of” precede the name of the consignee.  This requirement is in con-
formity with that of the uniform order bill of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission.  One of the easiest ways to commit fraud with
bills of lading formerly was to take a spent straight bill of lading,
which the carrier had not taken up, (as it need not) add the words
“or order” to the name of the consignee, and negotiate the docu-
ment as an order bill.  This possibility is entirely removed by the
requirement that the words of negotiability shall precede the name
of the consignee.  Indeed in the uniform order bill of lading, the
words of negotiability are printed in the bill.  Mr. McKeehan I think
misinterprets the Warehouse Receipts Act if he thinks that under
that Act the words of negotiability must follow the name of the
person to whom the goods are deliverable.  Words of negotiability
in warehouse receipts, as in Bills and Notes, may precede or follow
the name of the consignee.  In the law of Bills and Notes and in
common mercantile and legal speech, an instrument payable to the
order of A, and payable to A or order, is equally designated as an
instrument payable to A or order; though in strictly logical speech,
an instrument in the first form is not payable to A directly, if he
remains the holder.
The provision, which is so necessary in the case of bills of lad-
ing that the words of negotiability shall precede the consignee’s
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name, was not equally necessary in the case of warehouse receipts.
Mr. McKeehan quotes as a statement from my “Lectures on Com-
mercial Law” (Sec. 179, page 98) that the risk that a negotiable doc-
ument may be forged or altered “has in practice proved the most
serious risk of all.”  He adds: “Forgery is easy because of the care-
lessness with which receipts and bills of lading are made out.”  The
statement in my lectures was made explicitly in regard to Bills of
Lading; the application to Warehouse Receipts Acts is not mine.  I
do not think it true that warehouse receipts are carelessly made out;
they are ordinarily made out carefully and can easily be so made
out.  Before the enactment of the Warehouse Receipts Act, the
practice was usual as it now is to issue such receipts from a book
with serial numbers.  Warehouse receipts are issued from the princi-
pal office of the warehouseman and it is not difficult in most cases
to surround their issue with the care usual in the issue of bills and
notes if not with quite the same care as is used in regard to stock
certificates.  Bills of Lading, on the other hand, are issued from all
stations on large railroad systems.  Instead of emanating from one
central office, they emanate from hundreds and with some railroads
from thousands of different points.  Large shippers, especially man-
ufacturers frequently, if not usually, write their own bills of lading,
and the railroad agent merely signs the bill presented to him, check-
ing over the shipment hastily unless it is a “shippers load and
count” shipment.  Under these circumstances, there is great diffi-
culty in surrounding the issue of an order bill with the precautions
which are desirable in case of a valuable negotiable document.  It is
not necessary here to discuss the attempts which have been made to
meet the difficulty.  It is enough to point out here that these diffi-
culties do not exist in the case of Warehouse Receipts, and that
therefore it was unnecessary to put the same restriction on their
form as is put on the form of bills of lading.  The greatest risk in
warehouse receipts is their issue by warehousemen who are not fi-
nancially responsible, and especially the possibility of the issue of
receipts against the warehouseman’s own goods and a subsequent
dealing with both receipts and the goods.  This risk which is serious
in the case of warehouse receipts is negligible in the case of bills of
lading.
Purchase from a Thief or Finder
The opinion of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws un-
doubtedly underwent a change after the preparation of the Sales
Act and Warehouse Receipts Act, and before the promulgation of
the Bills of Lading Act and the Stock Certificates Act.  Even the
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earlier statutes go somewhat beyond the common law, as previously
understood, in protecting a purchaser of a document.  The later
statutes give the same negotiability to Bills of Lading as Bills of
Exchange possess.  The difference between the statutes is doubtless
undesirable, but if considered a serious matter is easily rectified by
a brief amendment to the Warehouse Receipts Act.
Summary
Enough has been said perhaps to indicate the undesirability, if
not impossibility, of having identical provisions in regard to bills of
lading and warehouse receipts.  A student who will carefully ex-
amine Mr. McKeehan’s article and the comments here made, will, I
think be disposed to agree that for most of the differences between
the statutes, there is a valid reason.  I have not discussed in detail all
the reasons, but only the most striking ones.  Such small residuum
of the points made by Mr. McKeehan as are well taken, I hope will
not seem to most students of the subject of sufficient consequence
to justify the somewhat drastic remedy that he proposes.
***
